Is an Automobile Owner Who Leaves His Keys in the Ignition Liable for a Thief’s Negligent Driving? by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1955 Issue 2 
January 1955 
Is an Automobile Owner Who Leaves His Keys in the Ignition 
Liable for a Thief’s Negligent Driving? 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Transportation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Is an Automobile Owner Who Leaves His Keys in the Ignition Liable for a Thief’s Negligent Driving?, 1955 
WASH. U. L. Q. 173 (1955). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss2/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
IS AN AUTOMOBILE OWNER WHO LEAVES HIS KEYS IN THE IGNITION
LIABLE FOR A THIEF'S NEGLIGENT DRIVING?
A parks his car leaving his keys in the ignition and the door un-
locked. B steals the car and in making his escape drives negligently to
the injury of C, an innocent third party. C brings an action against
A for negligence. Is he entitled to recover? Does it make any differ-
ence whether there is a penal statute making it unlawful to park in
this manner? The purpose of this note is to examine the judicial
treatment of this general factual situation and to determine the proper
analytical approach to the problems it presents.
In the recent Illinois case of Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.,' the defendant's
taxicab driver left his vehicle parked with the motor running and the
key in the ignition in violation of a penal statute. The statute, similar
to enactments existing in several other jurisdictions, states:
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it
to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the
ignition and removing the key, or when standing upon any per-
ceptible grade without effectively setting the brake thereon and
turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.2
A thief stole the cab and while fleeing the scene of the crime negli-
gently damaged the plaintiff's car. The defendant's motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's petition for failure to state a cause of action was denied,
and when defendant elected to stand by his motion, the trial court,
after hearing plaintiff's evidence, gave judgment for the plaintiff. The
intermediate appellate court affirmed.3 The Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the lower court decision, stating that it could not hold that as
a matter of law there was no liability. The only other court which
has predicated liability on a similar enactment is the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Ross -v. Hartman.4 Indiana,5 Massa-
1. 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
2. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 95%, § 189 (1953). Other "key-in-the-ignition" statutes
are: ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 27 (Supp. 1953); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-651 (1947);
COLO. REv. STAT. c. 13-4-76 (1953); TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATIONS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 58; IDAHO CoD ANN. § 49-560.1 (Supp. 1953);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2124 (Burns 1952); Ky. REv. STAT. § 189.430 (1953); MD.
ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 66%, § 212 (1951); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 8219 (1942);
N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 64-18-53 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-491 (1952); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-6-105 (1953); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 60-530 (1945). Missouri
has a similar statute, Mo. REv. STAT. § 304.150 (1949), but civil liability appar-
ently cannot be predicated upon its violation. For a discussion of this statute, see
19 KAN. CiTy L. REv. 112 (1951).
3. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 348 ilL App. 161, 108 N.E.2d 508 (1952).
4. 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
5. Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
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chusetts and Minnesota,7 where such statutes are also in force, have
held as a matter of law that there is no liability.
The primary matter to be considered in regard to these divergent
results on identical fact situations is the applicability of the statute.$
The three courts which have denied liability have avoided considering
legislative intent in regard to the statute by holding that, even under
an assumption that the statute was evidence that the defendant's ini-
tial conduct was negligent, the subsequent theft and negligent driving
were superseding causes negating liability.9 In the Ney case, the court
f6und the requisite legislative intent to make a breach of the statute
evidence of negligence and held that the issues of negligence and proxi-
mate cause were for the jury.0 In the Ross case, Judge Edgerton
found both that the statute was applicable and that there is no proxi-
mate cause question involved in this type of case; thus, since viola-
tion of a penal law is negligence per se in the District of Columbia,'
the defendant was liable as a matter of law.12
Generally, the fact that a statute is penal in character and makes no
provision for civil liability does not of itself prevent it from being used
to impose such liability for harm resulting from its breach. It is, of
course, the task of the court to determine legislative intent on this
point in interpreting the statute.13 It is apparent that generally there
is no actual legislative intention to impose civil liability for the viola-
tion of a penal statute unless the enactment is expressly so worded."
The courts, however, have said that such intention may be implied
where two requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff must be within the
class of persons protected by the statute; and (2) the harm suffered
must be the kind that the legislature intended to preventV5 The two
requirements are realistically mere "canons of judicial good man-
ners"16 which courts feel must be complied with before they can engage
6. Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass, 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948).
7. Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
8. Whenever the word "statute" is used, it shall also include ordinances or
similar provisions passed by legislative authority. See PROSSER, TORTS 264 (1941);
RESTATEBRENT, TORTS § 286 -(1934).
9. Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 593-594 106 X E 2d 395, 397-398(1952); Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 261, 81 N.E.2d 560, 564 (1948);
Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Miin. 369, 371-372, 43 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1950).
10. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 11. 2d 74, 83-84, 117 N.E.2d 74, 80 (1954).
11. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Danzansky v. Zimbolist,
105 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
12. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Violation of a
statute is only evidence of negligence in Illinois; Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d
74, 78, 117 N.E.2d 74, 78 (1954).
13. See de Sloovbre, The Function of Judge and Jury in the Interpretation ofStatutes, 46 HARv. L. REV. 1086 (1933).
14. PROSSER, TORTS 265 (1941).
15. PROSSER, TORTS 266, 269 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934).
16. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L.
REV. 361, 362 (1932).
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in a measure of judicial law-making." Judge Edgerton found both
requirements with relative ease in the Ross case's as did the court in
the Ney case.2
It should be pointed out that although the legislature has no specific
intent to make violation of a penal statute a ground for civil liability,
use of the statute for such a purpose would nonetheless seem appro-
priate because: (1) the statute theoretically provides notice to the
public that such conduct is no longer socially acceptable, and certainly
provides a means of obtaining such notice; (2) it indicates that some
sort of practical problem exists which society, acting through the
legislature, desires to eliminate. Thus, it becomes apparent that it is
the general policy of the statute that is of basic importance, and no
search for a particular mythical intent should be attempted.21 It ap-
pears that the two requirements the courts have applied before they
will find civil liability for the breach of a penal statute are appropriate
criteria to test whether the statute expresses a policy which should
be the ground for civil liability.
The requirement that the plaintiff be within the class of persons the
legislature intended to protect should be easily found in statutes re-
quiring the key of a car to be removed from the ignition. Such an
enactment is usually part of a series of measures concerning public
safety and is written in conjunction with other provisions requiring a
car to have a horn and headlights, the brake to be set, the *heels
turned into the curb and similar provisions.22 If the plaintiff has been
personally injured while in another car, on the sidewalk or in the
general vicinity of the street, he should be within the class of per-
sons to be protected since the statute is for the safety of the public.
The second requirement, however, that the harm suffered must be
the kind the statute was intended to prevent, presents rather difficult
problems. If the court in an evidence of negligence jurisdiction finds a
penal statute applicable, then the statute is presented to the jury to
consider as evidence upon which to predicate liability; the jury may
give the statute as much probative value as it wishes in determining
the specific issue of negligence which it must decide.23 To find the
statute applicable in the "key-in-the-ignition" cases, the court should
need to find no more than a general likelihood of injury from some
17. Id. at 363; PROSSER, TORTS 265 (1941). See PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE:
MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 300-304, 571-577 (1953).
18. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
19. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 11. 2d 74, 78, 117 N.E.2d 74, 77 (1954).
20. See Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 CoL.
L. RKV. 21, 23 (1949).
21. See PROSSER, ToRTs 269-271 (1941).
22. See, e.g., the provisions adjoining the statutes cited in note 2 supra.
23. PROSSEF, TORTs 275 (1941).
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intermeddler.2 The jury then determines the specific issue of negli-
gence on which the statute bears, i.e., whether, under ll the circum-
stances of the case, the likelihood of injury from a thief exposed the
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm. This procedure, of course,
is in keeping with the premise of fault liability that a person should
not be liable unless he is guilty of specific acts of negligence under the
circumstances, and is the proper approach in these cases. The latter
proposition, however, raises problems in a negligence per se jurisdic-
tion. If the court finds a penal statute applicable in this type of juris-
diction, then it is obligated to direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the
facts are undisputed and there is no question of proximate cause.2 5
Since there is no jury to which the task of finding specific negligence
can be delegated, the court should also make this determination.
Therefore, the second requirement, that the harm suffered should be
of the kind the statute was intended to prevent, should not be satisfied
merely by finding that there is a general likelihood that some third
party might meddle With the car; a specific finding should be made
that there is a likelihood that a thief might take the car and operate it
in a negligent manner.21
In view of the followving relevant considerations it seems a court
would be justified either in finding the statute applicable in an evidence
of negligence jurisdiction or in imposing liability as a matter of law
in a negligence per se jurisdiction :27 (1) the notorious increase in
24, There is no direct authority -on this point, but it is submitted that it is the
proper view. *In Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 78, 117 N.E.2d 74, 77 (1954),
the court did say:
We . . . conclude that this entire section is a public safety measure. This
being so, what harm did the legislature foresee and attempt to prevent by
prohibiting the leaving of an unattended motor vehicle with the key in the
ignition? The motor vehicle with the key in its ignition in itself could obvi-
ously do no harm.
The quoted passage would seem to indicate that the court was interested only in
finding a general likelihood of injury by some intermeddler and not a specific
likelihood of injury by a thief.
25. PR0oSSn. ToRTS 274 (1941). In a majority of jurisdictions, violation of a
statute is negligence per se. Ibid.
26. There is no direct authority on this point, but it is submitted that it is the
proper view. See Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
27. In a negligence per 'se jurisdiction, the determination of whether the
statute is applicable would seem to depend, as a practical matter, on the area in
which the case is being tried. If suit is brought in a rural area, where likelihood
of theft is remote, it would be an undue hardship on the plaintiff to impose lia-
bility; if the case occurs in an urban area on the other hand, the imposition of
liability 'would seem more appropriate. I? the general factual situation under
discussion arises for the first time in a city, and an imposition of liability is
affirmed on appeal to the highest court in the state, a judge sitting in a rural
area in a negligence per se jurisdiction would be bound to direct a verdict for
the plaintiff if the same situation later arose-in his ';urisdicton. This would be
inequitable because of the remote chance of theft and the frequency with which
keys are left in the ignition in the country. The only appropriate solution to this
problem is to keep legislative enactments of this type on a local level in the form
of ordinances. This is especially so in states which have both large urban popula-
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automobile thefts ;28 (2) the probability that a thief will be something
less than the "reasonably prudent man"; (3) the increasing problem
of "car-borrowing" by juvenile delinquents ;29 (4) the increased like-
lihood of negligence with a juvenile "car-borrower" or thief at the
wheel; (5) the increase in the number of accidents caused by careless
driving; and (6) the increasing number of cases involving circum-
stances of the very type under consideration.30
In a majority of the cases involving the factual situation under dis-
cussion, however, there was no statute involved, and all but one court 31
have decided as a matter of law that there is no liability.3 2 The usual
ground for so holding is that the antecedent negligence is not the prox-
imate cause of the injury.3 3 One court has held that there is no ante-
cedent negligence at all,34 and another has said that there is no duty
owed by the owner to the injured party.3 5 From whatever standpoint
the problem is attacked, however, it appears that the basic decision of
the court in all cases denying liability is that, under the circumstances,
this particular sequence of events is so far removed from the original
act that there should be no liability as a matter of law.
Of all the opinions written which make such a finding, the one by"
Judge Traynor in Richards v. Stanley36 is the most unusual because it
is the only decision saying that there is no duty owed to the plaintiff
by the defendant under the circumstances. In the Richards case the
defendant left his car unattended, unlocked and with the key in the
ignition on a public street in a populous section of San Francisco at
about 5:30 P.M. Within fifteen minutes after the defendant had so
tions and substantial rural areas. The problem would not be as acute in juris-
dictions where violation of a legislative enactment is merely evidence of negligence,
since there it is for the jury to make the final decision as to defendant's liability.
28. See Comment, 38 MARQ. L. REv. 99 (1954).
29. Ibid.
30. A large majority of the cases have arisen within the last twelve years.
See cases cited in notes 3-7 supra and notes 31,32 infra.
31. Schaff v. Claxton, 144 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944). The statute involved in
the Ross case was not applicable because the vehicle was not parked on a street
or other public place. See TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATIONS FOR THB
Disriucr OF COLUMBIA § 58.
32. Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954); Fulco v. City Ice Service,
Inc., 59 So.2d 198 (La. App. 1951); Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App.
1951); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Reti v. Vaniska, Inc.,
14 NJ. Super. 94, 81 A.2d 377 (1951); Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254 78
A.2d 288 (1951); Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th
Dep't 1947) ; cf. Howard v. Swagart, 161. F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
Several of these courts have carefully distinguished the non-statutory situation
from cases in which a statute is involved: Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23 (Cal.
1954); Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142
Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947).
33. Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142
Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94, 81'A.2d
377 (1951); Lotito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dept
1947); cf. Howard v. Swagart, 161 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
34. Fulco v. City Ice Service, Inc., 59 So.2d 198 (La. App. 1951).
35. Richs.rds v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954).
36. 271 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954).
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parked, a thief had stolen the car and due to his negligent operation
the vehicle had collided with the plaintiff's motorcycle about three
miles from the scene of the theft.
Judge Traynor's holding that no duty was owed to the plaintiff by
the defendant under these circumstances apparently was based in
part on the theory that the general duty owed to the public by a driver
to manage his automobile without creating an unreasonable risk of
harm to others ceased when the defendant left the car in a position
where it could harm no one.31 After this point in time, no new duty
to protect the plaintiff from harm which might be inflicted by a third
party could arise, for it is clearly a general rule of tort law that in the
absence of a special relationship between the defendant and the plain-
tiff, or between the defendant and the third party, no person owes a
duty to control the conduct of a third party to prevent him from
causing harm to another. 8 The statement that the duty of reasonable
management of the vehicle ended when it was left in a "harmless"
condition seems to bdg the question whether the car was, in fact, in a
"harmless" condition, and seems merely another way of stating the
proposition that the injury was too far removed from the original act
to permit the case to go to the jury.
It appears, however, that the fundamental basis for the decision
was Judge Traynor's feeling"9 that it would be anomalous to hold
that there could be liability where one leaves his key in the ignition
and a third party takes the car without permission and injures the
plaintiff, when it is also a part of the common law of California that
one is not liable for injuries to third persons if he actually hands over
the keys and lends the car to a third party unless he knows of, or has
reason to know of, the borrower's incompetence." Also, according to
a California motor vehicle statute,4 2 the owner of an automobile en-
trusting it to a third party is liable for the negligent operation of the
car by that party but only for a sum restricted to a, maximum of
$10,000. In the Ric~rds case, however, if there could be liability at
all, it would be common law liability with no restriction except that
found by the jury.
Neither of the reasons advanced by Judge Traynor seems compel-
ling. His first argument is based on the belief that the owner of a car
exposes the public to a greater risk of harm when he entrusts his
37. Id. at 27.
38. Ibid. See PRossEi, ToMrs 190-200 (1941); RSTATEENT, ToRrs § 315
(1934).
39. Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23, 28 (Cal. 1954).
40. Lane v. Bing, 202 Cal. 590, 262 Pac. 318 (1927). Suit can be brought in
California both under common law principles and under California's motor vehicle
statute, inf/a note 41. See L-cCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal. App. 2d 546, 109 P.2d 358(1941).
41. CA.. VERICLE CODE ANN. § 402 (Supp. 1953).
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automobile to a third party than when he does not entrust it but leaves
the keys in the ignition.42 However, if that is the premise, then there
should never be liability when there is no entrustment; but Judge
Traynor is unwilling to take this position, and maintains that there
may be liability for harm caused by intermeddlers other than thieves.4 3
Also, the premise itself is open to serious question. Foreseeability of
harm is the test of negligent conduct. Clearly under some circum-
stances the act of entrusting a car to a third party subjects the public
to no risk of harm at all, while leaving a car unattended but in a place
where intermeddlers are likely to tamper with it does create a very
substantial likelihood of injury. The answer to the second argument
seems to be that there is a distinction between damages imposed for
liability without fault as in the case involving the motor vehicle statute
and liability with fault as in cases involving the facts under discussion.
In the District of Columbia, Judge Edgerton has displayed a com-
plete understanding of the problem both in statutory" and non-statu-
tory"s situations. In Schaff v. Claxton ," a case similar to Ross v. Hart-
man4r except that no statute was involved because the vehicle was not
parked on a public street," Judge Edgerton held that the question of
liability should be submitted to the jury." This is the only decision
not involving a statute in which a court has held that there is a sub-
missible case for the jury.
Judge Edgerton's position apparently is that in the non-statutory
situation there is a general duty of due care owed to the plaintiff by
the defendant; therefore, the decision whether the question of liability
should be taken from the jury depends on the circumstances of the
particular case. It is submitted that this is the proper viewpoint, and
that the court was in error in holding that there was no jury question
in the Richards case. The fact that the events of that case took place
in a populous section of a large city seems to increase the likelihood
of a theft. 0 This factor, in addition to all the other considerations
previously discussed" which bear on a judge's decision in a negligence
per se jurisdiction on whether there should be liability as a matter
42. Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23, 28 (Cal. 1954).
48. Id. at 27.
44. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943). See text supported by notes
4-19 supra.
45. Schaff v. Claxton, 144 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
46. Ibid.
47. 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
48. Schaff v. Claxton, 144 F.2d 532, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1944). See note 31 supra.
49. Schaff v. Claxton, 144 F.2d 532, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1944). This holding followed
some dicta expressed by Judge Edgerton in Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15
(D.C. Cir. 1943), where he said:
In the absence of an ordinance, therefore, leaving a car unlocked might not
be negligent in some circumstances, although in other circumstances it might
be both negligent and a legal or "proximate" cause of a resulting accident.
50. See text supported by note 36 supra.
51. See text supported by notes 27-30 supra.
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of law, seems to justify sending cases like the Richards case to the
jury. If, on the other hand, the events take place in a small town
where the stealing of cars and the possibility of juvenile delinquents
taking a "joy-ride" are small, the court should find no negligence as a
matter of law.52 By a consideration of all relevant factors, a court
should decide whether there is a jury question, but it is submitted the
courts should not be as reluctant as they have been to submit the
problem to the jury.
In either a negligence per se or evidence of negligence jurisdiction,
the court should consider the proximate causation problem only after
it has held a statute applicable, or where there is no statute, only
after it has decided there is a question of negligence for the jury 3
The proximate cause question, although arising under similar factual
circumstances, has been treated in diverse manners by the courts.
Judge Edgerton in the Ross case,54 and Judge Traynor in the Richards
case, 55 have said there is no question of proximate causation involved.
The court in the Ney case56 said there is such a problem and that the
jury should decide whether the antecedent negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Courts in several other jurisdictions have
said that a proximate cause question exists, but that, as a matter of
law, the negligent operation of the car by a thief is a superseding
cause cutting off liability.57
The analysis of Judges Edgerton and Traynor on the proximate
cause problem appears to be the most sound. If the court decides that
the statute is applicable, or, absent a statute, that under the circum-
stances there is a submissible case of negligence for the jury, there is
no proximate cause problem concerning the intervening force of the
negligent operation of the car by a thief. Section 449 of the Restate-
ment of Torts points this out:
If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a
particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negli-
gent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor
from being liable for the harm caused thereby.58
52. See, e.g., Midkiff v. -Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951). See note 27
supra.
53. Another issue which could arise is that of factual causation-the de-
fendant's act must be a substantial factor in bringing about the result. Patossun,
ToRTs 321-326 (1941). This issue is usually no problem in the general situation
under discussion because, usually, the injury would not have occurred but for
the leaving of the key in the ignition. See Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 n.10
(D.C. Cir. 1943).
54. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
55. Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23, 25 (Cal. 1954).
56. Ney v. Yellow Cab. Co., 2 I1. 2d 74, 83, 117 N.E.2d 74, 80 (1954).
57. See note 33 supra.
58. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 449 (1934).
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The possibility that a thief will take the car and injure a third party
is the very circumstance which makes leaving the keys in the ignition
negligent. It would indeed be anomalous then to say that although
the conduct may be negligent, the intervening criminal and tortiOus
conduct is a superseding cause cutting off liability.
There is, however, a different proximate causation problem which
might arise. This revolves around the question of how soon after the
theft the plaintiff suffered damage. 59 The lapse of time should be
considered in determining whether the negligence is the proximate
cause of the injury; as a matter of substantial justice the defendant
should not be held liable when the time lag between the intervening
events of theft and negligence is too great.8 ' The problem of time
involves three factual possibilities: the negligent act occurred (1) im-
mediately after the theft, (2) a moderate time after the theft, or (3)
long after the theft.
The majority of cases which arise come within the first situation.4 '
Here, there should be no proximate cause question for the jury be-
cause the injury occurred so soon after the theft that time cannot be.
considered a substantial factor in determining liability. In the second
situation, the question of the importance of time should always be for
the jury ;62 whether the time lag is too great for there to be liability
is a question on which reasonable minds could differ, and therefore
the court cannot decide the question as a matter of law. In the third
situation, i.e., where the negligent act occurred long after the theft,
reasonable men could not differ and the court should hold. that there
is no liability as a matter of law.6 3 It is only in the second situation,
therefore, that there is a proximate cause question for the jury.
In summary, the general factual situation which has been discussed
is somewhat unusual in that there is both a criminal and negligent
act occurring after the original conduct of leaving the keys in the
ignition. The question is whether these two acts remove the original
conduct so far from the injury that there should be no liability as a
matter of law. This is a question of policy. It is submitted that if
there is a statute making the original conduct unlawful, in a negli-
gence per se jurisdiction the court should be willing to apply it and
59. The distance between the place of the theft and the place of injury presents
a problem of the same nature as the time factor. Often, both can be considered
directly proportional to each other. That is, the greater the time lapse the greater
will be the distance.
60. See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 433(d), comment h; Edgerton, Legal Cause,
72 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 211, 343 (1924).
61. All the cases discovered by the writers came within the first situation
except Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948) (two or three
hours apparently elapsed). Unfortunately, the courts rarely indicate exactly what
time lapse there was between the theft and the injury.
62. Galbraith v. Levin, supra note 61, apparently falls within this situation.
63. See Howard v. Swagart, 161 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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find negligence as a matter of law,6" and a court in an evidence of
negligence jurisdiction should be willing to submit the case to the
jury6- Although a court must proceed without the indirect support of
the legislature in a jurisdiction where there is no "key-in-the-ignition"
legislation, it. is submitted that, as a general proposition, the question
of liability should be allowed to go to the jury. In all cases, the view
of Section 449 of the Restatement of Torts, should be applied to
eliminate the problem of an intervening force, and the only proximate
cause issue arising should be the question of the time lapse between
the theft and the injury to the plaintiff. L
LAN C. KOHN
ROBERT L. MUELLER
64. But consider the implications of note 27 supra.
65. But consider the text supported by note 52 supra.
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